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PROVISIONING MODELS VS. PRUDENTIAL MODELS
This article discusses the interaction of and relationship between accounting and capital 
rules. In 2018 accounting rules adopted IFRS9, changing the way provisions are calculated 
from an “incurred losses” to an “expected credit losses” paradigm (ECL).
Following a broad description of provisioning and prudential models, the author analyses 
in greater detail how IFRS9 affects average capital requirements and their cyclicality.
The conclusion is that under current capital requirement rules and the IFRS9 framework, 
both average capital requirements and their cyclicality will probably increase.
Additionally, the author examines the foundations of current capital formulas that were 
developed under the incurred loss provisioning system. 
If it is true that ECL is a better predictor than the previous provisions mechanism, 
supervisors and regulators should conclude that a review of the capital requirement 
framework is needed in order to include this reduction in unexpected losses in the capital 
requirement calculation.
On the other hand, if ECL does not prove to be a better predictor for real losses than the 
previous provisioning methodology, accounting regulators should rethink the ECL concept.
Recently accounting rules have adopted IFRS9, changing the way provisions are calculated 
from an “incurred losses” paradigm to a “conditional expected loss” paradigm. 
The global financial crisis brought to the light the limitations of the incurred loss approach, 
summarized in the sentence “too little, too late”. 
Consequently the G20 required accounting standard setters to define approaches to 
recognise credit losses which would be more forward looking, trying to include information 
about the (current and future) macroeconomic environment. In other words, the G20 was 
calling for the adoption of expected credit loss approaches for the computation of credit 
losses.
As Antonio Sánchez Serrano (2018) “Financial stability consequences of the expected 
credit loss model in IFRS9” says:
“Following the G20 mandate, there has been a move from incurred loss approaches for the 
recognition of credit losses to expected credit loss approaches. Since 1 January 2018, 
European banks follow the approach defined by IFRS 9, according to which, exposures 
are allocated to three stages depending on their relative credit risk. Overall, the timelier 
and fuller recognition of credit losses is expected to bring substantial benefits to financial 
stability1.”
1 If the reader is interested in understanding how works IFRS 9, there are some useful introductory documents 
included in the references’ chapter like “IFRS 9, Financial Instruments Understanding the basics, PWC”, “IFRS 9 and 
expected loss provisioning - Executive Summary (December 2017). FSI Descriptive”, “In depth IFRS 9 impairment: 
significant increase in credit risk (December 2017), PWC” or Pilar Barrios and Paula Papp “FRS 9: A new model for 
expected loss provisions for credit risk” (January 2017).
Abstract
1 Introduction
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“However, IFRS 9 is not going to be applied with perfect foresight. On the contrary, 
expected credit loss models would be able to anticipate downturns only shortly before 
their occurrence. At the onset, a system-wide sizable increase in provisions associated 
with expected credit losses can be expected, which may have undesired procyclical 
effects via banks’ profits and regulatory capital.”
“The paradigm shift in accounting for credit losses may call for a policy reflection on […] 
the interaction with the current regulatory framework.»
The debate about the pro-cyclicality of IFRS9 is on the table and policymakers must 
understand the interaction between cyclicality, new provisions’ rules and capital 
requirements’ models.
More detailed information about cyclicality can be found in some references as “Jorge 
Abad and Javier Suárez (July 2017) - Assessing the cyclical implications of IFRS 9 – a 
recursive model” or “Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven (May 2018) - The Procyclicality of 
Banking: Evidence from the Euro Area”.
This article is mainly focused on a particular facet of the cyclicality issue; the interaction 
between IFRS9 and capital (prudential) requirements, trying to analyze 3 basic 
questions:
– If IFRS9 will affect the average capital requirement level.
– If IFRS9 will affect the volatility of the capital requirement.
– If Basel II capital requirement formulas should be changed or adapted to take 
into account IFRS9.
The conclusion of section 7 seems to support the idea that the interaction between 
current capital requirement rules and IFRS9 will increase both, the average capital 
requirement and the cyclicality of the capital requirement2. 
Other relevant articles included in the references’ section are:
– Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (July 2005). “An Explanatory Note on 
the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions”; where the reader can understand the 
foundation of the capital requirements formula under internal models.
– “Expected credit loss approaches in Europe and the United States: differences 
from a financial stability perspective” (January 2019). European Systemic risk 
Board (ESRB); where the reader can learn about the different approaches 
followed by Europe and US on accounting provisioning.
– Jorge Abad and Javier Suárez (July 2017) “Assessing the cyclical implications 
of IFRS 9 – a recursive model” Occasional Paper Series No 12. European 
Systemic risk Board (ESRB), where authors simulate the behavior of a Financial 
2 As this paper is not a research article based on empirical work, you must be careful about the conclusions. This 
article does not expect to demonstrate that IFRS9 increases cyclicality with no doubt; however, it offers some 
hints that could be useful for future empirical papers.
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Institution under a IFRS9 provisioning paradigm and show how capital cyclicality 
increases under different scenarios.
Recently, accounting rules have changed the way provisions are estimated. The previous 
accounting paradigm was based on the concept of “incurred losses”. Now, with the new 
changes implemented by IFRS9, the approach has changed from “incurred losses” to 
“Expected Losses”.
Expected losses (EL) are a new concept in accounting. However, in prudential regulation, 
expected losses are a key component in the capital requirement calculation.
From the implementation of Basel II regulation, Financial Entities can use internal models 
for calculating their credit risk capital requirements. The theoretical foundation of these 
internal models relies on the concept of unexpected credit loss.
A bank needs capital in order to cover unexpected losses.
From a prudential point of view, the role of provisions is to cover what is expected 
to happen however the role of capital is to cover what is unexpected to happen (but can 
happen).
It must be noted that this prudential point of view of provisions is different from the 
accounting point of view.
Before IFRS9 implementation, the role of provisions was to cover what has happened 
(that is, to cover incurred losses). This view has been recently modified with the new 
IFRS9 regulation. Under IFRS9 the role of provisions is to cover what is expected to 
happen.
Later we will see that, amazingly, what is expected to happen can be different from a 
prudential point or from an accounting point of view.
It could seem strange that accounting rules and prudential rules could differ given they 
deal about very similar concepts (at least theoretically), however, it must be noted that 
objectives of Prudential Regulation and accounting are quite different.
On the one hand “accounting regulation” is focused on the “value of assets” trying to give 
an unbiased view of that value to investors and other stakeholders. In that sense accounting 
is interested in estimating the level of loss associated to each loan in the Bank’s portfolio, 
given the current conditions but also future expected conditions3.
However, on the other hand, “prudential regulation” tries to establish and define 
backstops to achieve safest financial systems. In this sense, prudential regulation is 
focused on the “prudential value of assets” and how to guarantee that the amount of 
capital is enough to cover the prudential (stressed) value of assets under an adverse 
scenario.
3 This is one of the biggest characteristics of IFRS9. IFRS9 provisions consider the future expected evolution of 
the economy. IFRS9 is not only considering the current situation but it also tries to guess what is expected for the 
future.  
2  Provisioning models 
vs. prudential models
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Prudential regulation is not only interested in the current or expected level of loss but is 
also interested in the potential future level of loss under an adverse scenario (technically, 
prudential regulation tries to estimate a loss distribution percentile).
Although accounting and prudential regulations seem to use similar concepts (EL), their 
aim is clearly different. 
In this section we will see that there are different definitions or approaches to measure the 
expected loss.
First of all we will define two different concepts of expected losses, conditional expected 
loss vs. unconditional expected loss.
– Conditional expected loss is the expected level of loss given the macroeconomic 
state of the economy.
– Unconditional expected loss is the expected level of loss without taking into 
account the macroeconomic state of the economy. 
Unconditional expected losses can be thought as the average of the conditional expected 
loss over all possible macroeconomic states.
Historically, prudential regulation has preferred unconditional models (later we will discuss 
on this more deeply).
In its explanatory note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions (July 2005), the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision defines capital as the loss surprise over the 
unconditional expected loss. On the other hand accounting regulation (IFRS9) has 
preferred to focus on conditional models.
Also expected losses can be different depending on the “time horizon”. Typically there 
are two principal possibilities; “one year expected losses” vs. “lifetime expected 
losses”:
– One year expected loss is the expected level of loss for the next year.
– Lifetime expected loss is the expected level of loss considering the residual 
maturity of a loan or portfolio.
As the reader can imagine, both axis can be mixed so we can obtain 4 different concepts 
of expected losses:
One year unconditional EL Lifetime unconditional EL
One year conditional EL Lifetime conditional EL
As we will see later, IFRS9 uses conditional EL and, depending on the portfolio stage (1, 2 
or 3), it uses one year EL (for Stage 1) or lifetime EL (for Stages 2 or 3).
3  Measuring the 
Expected Loss
3.1  CONDITIONAL OR 
UNCONDITIONAL 
3.2 TIME HORIZON 
3.3  MIXING CONDITIONALITY 
AND TIME HORIZON 
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On the other hand, Capital regulation uses unconditional EL4 and one year time horizon for 
non-defaulted assets or lifetime for defaulted assets.  
Technical jargon also uses the name “Point In Time EL (PIT EL)” for conditional expected 
losses and the name “Through The Cycle EL (TTC EL)” for unconditional expected losses.
As we have said in the previous section, Capital models and IFRS9 models use different 
approaches in order to measure expected losses.
Provisioning (IFRS9) models are based on conditional expected losses (for both PD’s and 
LGD’s) however capital models are based on a mixture of unconditional expected PD’s 
(TTC) and stressed LGD’s (unconditional “stressed” expected loss).
But also time horizons are different.
In order to estimate the adequate level of provisions, accounting models (IFRS9) have 
defined expected credit loss (ECL) as:
– Stage 1: “one year expected losses, using conditional PD’s and LGD’s”.
– Stage 2: “lifetime expected losses, using conditional PD’s and LGD’s”.
– Stage 3: “lifetime expected loss using conditional LGD’s (PD=100%)”.
On the other hand, prudential regulation uses its own definition of Expected Loss (Capital 
EL):
– Non-defaulted assets: “one year expected losses using TTC  PD’s but Downturn 
LGD’s5”.
– Defaulted assets: “lifetime expected loss BE (best estimate) plus additional 
unexpected losses (PD=100%)”.
It is important to note that segmentation is also different. IFRS9 uses “stages (1, 2 or 3)” 
but capital rules uses “defaulted vs. non-defaulted”, with the additional problem that there 
is no guarantee for a perfect match between both segmentations. 
Normally Stage 1 assets are non-defaulted assets, Stage 3 assets are defaulted assets, 
but Stage 2 can be composed by both, defaulted and non-defaulted.
Next table shows a summary of the different approaches6. In order to facilitate the 
discussion, the table assumes that non-defaulted assets are Stage 1 plus Stage 2, and 
defaulted assets are equal to Stage 3 assets.
4 To be precise, capital regulation uses the concept of “downturn EL”, that is, an EL calculated using an 
unconditional PD and a downturn LGD.
5 Downturn LGD means “expected LGD under an adverse macroeconomic scenario” so Downturn LGD is basically 
a conditional expected LGD.
6 The discussion is  mostly based on PD and LGD, however same issues apply to CCF (credit conversion factor).
4  How is expected loss 
measured? IFRS9 vs. 
Capital models
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From the implementation of Basel II regulation, Financial Entities can use internal models 
for credit risk capital requirements (subject to the supervisor’s approval).
The theoretical foundation of these internal models relies on the concept of unexpected 
credit loss (for a portfolio of loans).
A bank needs capital in order to cover unexpected losses.
From a prudential point of view, the role of provisions is to cover what is expected to 
happen but the role of capital is to cover what is unexpected to happen (but can happen).
Next paragraphs and charts, are extracted from the document “An Explanatory Note on 
the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions”, July 2005 Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.
5  What does Unexpected 
Loss mean?
3 egatS2 egatS1 egatS
Defaulted
Time Horizon emitefiLfetimeiLraey enO
PD's Conditional Conditional 100%
LGD's Conditional Conditional Conditional
Time Horizon One year One year Lifetime
PD's CTTCTT 100%
LGD's Downturn Downturn
Best estimate
+ Unexpected
Non Defaulted
Provisions
Capital EL 
THE ECL AND CAPITAL EL PUZZLE TABLE 1
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
SOURCE: BIS.
EXPECTED LOSS, UNEXPECTED LOSS AND LOSS DISTRIBUTION FIGURE 1
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“… As explained above, banks are expected in general to cover their Expected Losses on 
an ongoing basis, e.g. by provisions and write-offs, because it represents another cost 
component of the lending business. The Unexpected Loss, on the contrary, relates to 
potentially large losses that occur rather seldomly. According to this concept, capital 
would only be needed for absorbing Unexpected Losses.”
“Nevertheless, it has to be made sure that banks do indeed build enough provisions 
against EL. Up to the Third Consultative Paper of the Basel Committee, banks had thus 
been required to include EL in the risk weighted assets as well. Provisions set aside for 
credit losses could be counted against the EL portion of the risk weighted assets - as such 
only reducing the risk weighted assets by the amount of provisions actually built. In 
Figure 2 above, this would have meant to hold capital for the entire distance between the 
VaR and the origin (less provisions).” 
“… In the end, it was decided to follow the UL concept and to require banks to hold capital 
against UL only. However, in order to preserve a prudent level of overall funds, banks have 
to demonstrate that they build adequate provisions against EL. In above Figure 2, the risk 
weights now relate to the distance between the VaR and the EL only.” 
From the previous paragraphs, it seems clear that Basel II prudential regulation assumes 
an unconditional expected loss and tries to measure the volatility of losses around the 
expected loss (see Figure 1)
The difference between the expected loss and a given percentile of the loss distribution is 
the minimum level of capital a financial institution must hold (see Figure 2).
Basel II uses “Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) Models”, in order to estimate an 
analytical formula for the percentile of the credit loss distribution. 
Fixing the confidence level (99,9%) and the level of assets correlations,  capital requirement 
formulas can be deduced.
Next formula shows (a simplified version of) the Basell II risk weight functions, where 
explicitly it can be seen that the capital requirement is the credit loss percentile minus the 
unconditional one year expected loss:
SOURCE: BIS.
EXPECTED LOSS, UNEXPECTED LOSS AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FIGURE 2
Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Expected Loss (EL) Unexpected Loss (UL)
Potential Losses
100% minus Confidence
Level
Fr
ec
ue
nc
y
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 134 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 36
                             Conditional PD (conditional on a single factor with probability of 0,1%)
CapitalRequirement LGD N R G PD R R GDT 1 0 5 1 0 999
2 0 5
. / .
.
PD LGDDT
                                                                                 Unconditional PD                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                             
            Unconditional Expected 
                   loss with DT LGD
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
Or in a more condensed form:
CapitalRequirement     

LGD f PD R PD LGD
LGD f P
DT DT
DT
 

, , ,0 999
D R, , ,0 999  CapitalEL
This approach assumes that Capital EL is adequately covered by credit provisions, 
however in order to guarantee this, Basel II require banks to compare their level of 
provisions with the expected loss7.
If it is not the case and the level of provisions is lower than Capital EL8, banks must cover 
this shortfall with capital.
Interestingly, in the case of a surplus of provisions vs. Capital EL, there is an asymmetry in 
capital regulation and this does not mean a capital surplus.
CET1Requirement
Max
     

LGD f PD R PD LGD
PD
DT DT , , ,
,
0 999
0 LGD ProvisionDT  
or
CET1Requirement
Max Ca
     

LGD f PD R PD LGDDT DT , , ,
,
0 999
0 pitalEL  ECL
Under Basel II, Capital requirement depends on:
– Confidence level (99,9%): fixed by the regulator.
– Correlation: fixed by the regulator.
– PD: The higher the PD, the higher the capital requirement9.
– LGDDT: The higher the downturn LGD, the higher the capital requirement.
– The provisions shortfall (ECL vs. capital EL):
• When capital EL > ECL: CET1 must be adjusted (reduced).
• When capital EL < ECL: CET1 is not adjusted.
7 In fact this comparison must be done separately for defaulted and for non-defaulted assets.
8 Actually, remember that Capital EL is a kind of stressed EL, equal to PD x Downturn LGD. We can call “Capital 
EL” to this “stressed EL” calculated using a downturn LGD instead the average LGD.
9 This is true for low levels of PD. If PD is high enough (≥50%), capital requirements are decreasing in PD. If capital 
is identified as loss surprise, is PD is high there is little surprise, in fact if PD=100% there is no surprise at all.
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An interesting issue that arises when analyzing accounting rules and capital rules is the 
definition of default (DoD) issue.
As we have seen, for capital requirement purposes there are only two possible “stages”, 
assets can be defaulted or non-defaulted and the Definition of Default (DoD) is stablished 
by the supervisor/regulator.
However, for accounting purposes, there are 3 possible stages:
– Stage 1 is where credit risk has not increased significantly since initial 
recognition. For financial assets in stage 1, entities are required to recognize 
one year ECL.
– Stage 2 is where credit risk has increased significantly since initial 
recognition. For financial assets in Stage 2 entities are required to recognize 
lifetime ECL.
– Stage 3 is where the financial asset is credit impaired. The concept of 
impairment must be aligned with the internal credit risk management. 
For financial assets in stage 3, entities are required to recognize lifetime 
ECL.
Recently, in order to homogenize DoD, European supervisors and regulators (ECB and 
EBA) have developed detailed rules (materiality thresholds, days past due counting rules, 
cures, treatment of forbearance).
An interesting question is how the definition of default impacts on Expected and 
on Unexpected Losses and, in a second step, how DoD can alter capital 
requirements.
Surprisingly, as we will see, a more conservative definition of default does not automatically 
mean a higher capital requirement.
Clearly credit loss does not depend on the definition of default. Credit loss is the loss 
suffered because a client/counterparty does not comply with its contractual obligations 
and this loss is independent of the “definition of default”. Given that credit loss does not 
depend on DoD, also EL does not depend on the DoD.   
DoD basically permits to separate the effect of default between PD and LGD: 
– A more conservative DoD means a higher level of PD and, at the same time, a 
lower level of LGD.
– On the other hand a less conservative DoD means a lower level of PD and, at 
the same time, a higher level of LGD.
But, independently of the DoD, the product of PD times LGD will keep constant.
The same discussion could be applied to the unexpected credit loss, to change the DoD 
should not affect the unexpected credit loss.
6 Definition of default
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However, things are different when we talk about the capital requirement formula:
CET1Requirement
Ca
     

LGD f PD R PD LGD
Max
DT DT , , ,
,
0 999
0 pitalEL  ECL
It must be noted that f(PD,R,0,999) is a concave function on PD but Capital requirement 
formula is linear on LGD.
– If LGD doubles, then Capital requirement also doubles.
– If PD doubles, then capital requirement is less than the double.
As it can be seen in Figure 3.
In summary:
– A more conservative DoD implies higher levels of PD.
– A more conservative DoD implies lower levels of LGD.
– A more conservative DoD should not affect EL.
– A more conservative definition of default implies lower levels of Capital 
requirement.
Given that the Capital requirement (under Basel II) depends on the DoD, supervisors, in 
order to guarantee level playing field are strongly committed to assure that Financial 
Entities use the same DoD.
In this sense, for example, in Europe regulators/supervisors are publishing very detailed 
rules and guides about the definition of default.
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
CONCAVITY OF CAPITAL FUNCTION FIGURE 3
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There is a debate about if IFRS9 will increase or not profit & loss cyclicality. Very 
close to this debate, there is another additional debate about how IFRS9 will interact 
with capital requirements and if finally capital requirements under IFRS9 provisioning 
rules will be more (or not) cyclical than it previously was (under incurred losses 
paradigm).
Perhaps it is worth to think about “how the real world is”, independently of “how the real 
world is translated into an accounting entry”.
Maybe the reader agrees with the statements below:
– Real Credit Losses are cyclical (meaning that there are periods of high level of 
credit losses and periods of low level of credit losses).
– Real Credit Losses do not depend on accounting rules (meaning that real credit 
losses are generated by defaulted loans independently of the level of allowances 
or how these allowances are estimated).
On the other hand, if we remember the capital (CET1) requirement formula under IFRS9 
rules, 
CET1Requirement      

LGD f PD R PD LGD
Max PD
DT DT , , ,
,
0 999
0 LGD ECLDT  
Or
CET1Requirement
Ca
     

LGD f PD R PD LGD
Max
DT DT , , ,
,
0 999
0 pitalEL  ECL
In the previous equation we see clearly how IFRS9 interacts with capital.
The second part of the previous equation is an “asymmetric” adjustment that depends on 
the difference between the level of provisions driven by IFRS9 rules (ECL) and the EL used 
in capital calculation (Capital EL).
ECL: 
– Based on conditional PD’s.
– Time horizon: 1Y (Stage 1) or lifetime (Stage 2 and 3).
Capital EL:
– Based on unconditional PD’s (Trough the cycle).
– Time horizon: 1Y (for non defaulted assets) or lifetime (for defaulted assets)  or 
if we assume that the definition of default is equal to the Stage 3, 1Y (Stage 1 
and 2) or lifetime (Stage 3).
7  Some thoughts about 
capital EL and ECL 
cyclicality
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Assuming a common definition of default for both, capital regulation and IFRS9, basically 
there are 3 possible situations:
– “Defaulted/Stage 3” assets.
– “Non defaulted/Stage 2” assets.
– “Non defaulted/Stage 1” assets.
Next three sections will analyse the probable evolution of Capital EL and ECL for the 
previous 3 assets’ status and under different macroeconomic scenarios. 
In this case, both, Capital EL and ECL are “lifetime losses”.
Capital EL will evolve depending on two basic drivers, the amount of defaulted assets (or 
stage 3) and the evolution of the “Downturn LGD”.
IFRS9 ECL will also evolve depending on two basic drivers, the amount of Stage 3 assets (or 
defaulted assets) and the evolution of “conditional LGD”, in general “Downturn LGD” will be higher 
than “conditional LGD”, especially in good times, so ECL will be in general lower than Capital EL. 
Anyway, the main driver for the evolution of both, capital EL and ECL will be the amount of 
defaulted/Stage 3 assets, that clearly is a very cyclical variable. For good times, the amount 
of defaulted or Stage 3 assets will be low, however, in bad times defaulted/stage 3 assets 
will increase significantly.
Figure 4 illustrates the typical shape of the evolution of the Capital and ECL through the cycle.
7.1  DIFFERENCES ON  
DYNAMIC EVOLUTION  
BETWEEN “CAPITAL EL”  
AND “IFRS9 ECL”
7.1.1  “Defaulted/Stage 3” 
assets
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
EL AND ECL EVOLUTION FOR "DEFAULTED / STAGE 3" ASSETS FIGURE 4
Capital EL 
ECL IFRS9
Good economic
enviroment/
expectations
 Bad economic
enviroment/
expectations
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In this case, Capital EL is a one year EL, however, ECL for Stage 2 assets is a lifetime 
loss.
Capital EL will evolve depending on three drivers, the amount of Stage 2 assets, the 
evolution of “one year PD through the cycle” and the evolution of “Downturn LGD”.
Both elements, 1 Year PD TTC and Downturn LGD, should be quite stable over time, so 
main driver of the evolution of capital EL should be, as previously said, the amount of 
(Stage 2) assets that, again, should be very cyclical. In bad times, the amount of stage 2 
assets should increase materially.
On the other hand, IFRS9 ECL will evolve also depending on 3 drivers, the amount of 
Stage 3 assets, the evolution of the “lifetime PD” and the evolution of LGD. 
ECL should be in general higher than EL because:
– Amount of Stage 3 assets is equal for both.
– Downturn LGD should be in general higher than LGD.
– However, 1 year PD should be in general much lower than lifetime PD. Only for 
short term portfolios (typically less than 1 year) and in good times, conditional 
lifetime PD could be lower than PD TTC.
The combination of the three previous elements will drive the evolution of capital EL and 
ECL evolution, and, if assets average residual maturity is large enough, lifetime PD will 
make the difference.
Figure 5 illustrates how Capital EL and ECL evolution could evolve through the 
cycle:
7.1.2  “Non defaulted/Stage 2” 
assets
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
EL AND ECL EVOLUTION FOR “NON DEFAULTED / STAGE 2” ASSETS FIGURE 5
Good economic
enviroment/
expectations
 Bad economic
enviroment/
expectations
ECL IFRS9
Capital EL 
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– In good times, it should be expected a slightly higher ECL than EL (basically 
because ECL is lifetime and capital EL is one year).
– In bad times clearly ECL should be considerably higher than EL due to both, 
lifetime horizon and the use of conditional PD’s for ECL vs. 1 year TTC PDs for 
Capital EL.
In this case, both,  EL and ECL are one year losses, however EL uses TTC PD’s and 
stressed LGD and ECL uses PIT PD’s and LGD’s.
In this case, the cyclicality driven by the amount of Stage 1 assets should be much lower 
than in the previous two cases, and in fact it should be countercyclical (in bad times the 
amount of stage 1 loans would decrease). 
Under this framework it should be expected that in good times ECL should be lower than 
Capital EL and, on the other hand, in bad times ECL should be higher than Capital EL as 
Figure 6 shows.
Adding all previous effects into one picture: 
Good times Bad times
ralimiSllaftrohS1 egatS
sulpruSsulpruS2 egatS
ralimiSllaftrohS3 egatS
)2 egatS( sulpruSllaftrohs thgilSsoiloftrop llA
ECL VS. CAPITAL EL TABLE 2
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
7.1.3  “Non Defaulted/Stage 1” 
assets
7.1.4 Mixing all segments
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
EL AND ECL EVOLUTION FOR “NON DEFAULTED / STAGE 1” ASSETS FIGURE 6
Good economic
enviroment/
expectations
 Bad economic
enviroment/
expectations
ECL IFRS9
Capital EL 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 141 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 36
It can be expected that in good times, the difference between ECL and Capital EL, at 
aggregate level, should not be very material (with Capital EL perhaps slightly higher 
than ECL). However, in bad times, ECL should show a surplus when compared to 
Capital EL10.
However, remembering the capital formula, the factor that takes into account the difference 
between Capital EL and ECL is highly asymmetric:
CET1Requirement
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0 999
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This means that:
– In good Times: It should be expected a slightly shortfall:
• The level of provisions is lower than the Capital EL.
• The shortfall is adjusted in capital increasing the capital requirement.
– In bad Times: It should be expected a Surplus:
• The level of provisions is higher than the Capital EL (affecting P&L).
• The surplus is not adjusted in capital (there is no reduction in capital 
requirements).
This means that under the current capital rules and using IFRS9 framework for 
provisioning:
a) In average (averaging good and bad times), capital requirement would 
increase, because ECL does not match exactly with Capital EL and the capital 
adjustment that takes into account this mismatch is asymmetric.
b) But also, Capital requirement would be more volatile, for example, all other 
things equal, and given that IFRS9 provisions are based on conditional 
estimations, a future expected change in macroeconomic scenarios would 
affect “now” the level of provisions (increasing or decreasing ECL) and 
consequently would affect capital ratios, positively or negatively, increasing 
volatility.
As we have discussed previously, Basel 2 models were basically designed for 
estimating the unexpected loss, considering that the expected loss should be well 
covered by provisions. Capital is basically the unexpected loss, understanding this 
unexpected loss as the difference between the “real loss” and the (unconditional) 
expected loss.
10 If we analyse the difference between Capital EL and ECL through the cycle (averaging good and bad times), 
ECL should be higher than Capital EL because in stage 2 ECL is lifetime but Capital EL is 1 year.
8  Should IFRS9 
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However, under IFRS9 things are quite different. ECL is estimated as a conditional EL, so 
this means that IFRS9 tries to estimate the future level of losses (one year or lifetime) given 
the current (and future) macroeconomic scenarios.
Figure 7 ilustrates a theoretical evolution of the three concepts, the EL, the ECL and the 
“real loss”.
In this case, we see as ECL changes over time, trying to “predict” the future level of real 
losses. 
If we consider that ECL is a better predictor for the real level losses than it is the 
unconditional EL, it should be expected that the red line fits real losses (black line) better 
than the dashed line (dashed line is flat given it is an unconditional EL that does not take 
into account any future expectation).
In this is the case, the unexpected loss calculated as the difference between the red line 
(ECL) and the black line, should be lower than the unexpected loss calculated as the 
difference between the dashed line and the black line.
So, if provisions are based on “conditional expected losses” (red line) makes little sense to 
estimate unexpected losses comparing the percentile of the loss distribution with an EL 
based on a mixture of unconditional PD’s and DT LGD’s (Capital EL).
Perhaps the idea can be better understood if we analyze what happens in the limit. 
Imagine a “perfect” IFRS9 model, where ECL would be a “perfect” predictor of real credit 
losses (one year or lifetime depending on the portfolio).
In this case, Banks would not need capital to cover unexpected credit losses. Credit losses 
would be perfectly covered by the amount of provisions because credit losses are no 
longer random.
Figure 8  shows in the limit, what would happen under an error free ECL model.
SOURCE: BIS and own elaboration.
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In this case, all cyclicality effects would be captured via P&L but there would be no need 
to maintain a credit risk capital requirement11.
Obviously, It can be argued that there is no such thing as an “error free model”. That is 
true, however, it can be also argued that a conditional EL model should be at least equal 
(or better) than an unconditional EL model so under IFRS9, credit risk capital requirements 
should be lower than under an unconditional EL model for provisioning12. 
As a summary, under IFRS9 paradigm:
– Provisions are equal to ECL where ECL is basically a conditional expected loss 
(with different time horizons depending on the “stage”).
– If we consider that capital requirement should cover “loss surprises”, then 
capital requirement should be calculated as the difference between the real loss 
and the ECL (instead being calculated as the difference between the real 
loss and the unconditional expected loss).
– If ECL is better forecast for futures real losses (than incurred losses or 
unconditional expected losses), the level of “loss surprises” should decrease 
and, consequently, the level of capital requirement should also decrease.
– As results of previous points, from a theoretical point of view, changing provision 
rules from incurred losses to conditional expected losses should affect the 
Basel II capital formula itself.
– Additionally, the asymmetric adjustment included in the Basel II capital formula, 
that takes into account the difference between provisions and Capital EL, 
causes, on the one hand, additional cyclical effects and, on the other hand, 
11 Obviously, there are other risks not covered by ECL that can generate unexpected losses that would require a 
capital buffer (business risk, model risk, market risk, operational risk…).
12 Perhaps, a IFRS9 backtesting exercise would be a useful tool in order to determine the ECL forecast capacity. 
The higher the ECL forecast capacity, the lower the capital requirement. 
SOURCE: BIS and own elaboration.
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increases, in average, capital requirements if we compare the previous 
provisioning model (incurred losses). 
In order to estimate different parameters needed for ECL or Capital EL calculation 
(principally conditional or unconditional PD’s, LGD’s) Financial Institutions face some 
common challenges. Most of them relate to historical data, mostly lack of historical data 
or historical data biased:
– The historical databases used to estimate PD’s are composed of loans that 
have been approved by the Entity’s risk policies (bias). 
– A similar issue appears when estimating LGD’s, all the defaulted loans have 
passed the Entity’s workout process (bias). 
– Risk policies are not static, they evolve in time, introducing additional bias. 
A historical change in risk policies can affect the validity of the database.
– Also regulation evolves, affecting risk parameters (for example bankruptcy laws, 
definition of default…)
– In summary: Risk parameters (PD’s, LGD’s, CCF’s) are estimated based on 
historical information  obtained  from changing portfolios, policies, practices, 
rules, laws...
Previous issues also difficult models backtesting and, if that weren’t enough, historical 
data is additionally affected by economic cycles making backtesting even more difficult.
A classic claim of supervisors is about the use of this credit models also for management 
purposes. Clearly, If a provisioning or a capital model is also used for management purposes, 
that adds an additional comfort layer to the supervisors.
There are different uses of these type of models for managements, among them:
– Loan approval: Are the PD’s and LGD’s used in order to decide loan approval?
– Loan pricing: Are expected losses took into account in order to decide the loan 
price (credit spread)?  
– Workout strategies: Do workout strategies take into account expected LGD in 
order to define processes, priorities, workflows…? 
– Capital planning: When deciding the capital ratio target, does the entity take 
into account portfolio’s risk parameters?
– Stress test: How is stress test built? Is the stress test taking into account conditional 
expected losses in a consistent way and aligned with other conditional expected 
loss models like ECL?
All this questions are clearly relevant for both, supervisors and supervised entities. 
However there are several practical problems for using this type of models in management. 
9  Some words about 
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As we have seen, capital models and provision models are different, so the first question 
is which one should we use?
On the other hand, and specially dealing with  capital models, these models are subject to 
a very detailed set of conditions, including conservative (or prudential if you prefer) 
adjustments that makes difficult their use for managing purposes. Should Financial Entities 
use those “conservative” parameters defined by the supervisor for management? If the 
answer to this question is yes, how financial entities should adapt their management 
models in order to include those conservative parameters?
Finally, management practices can evolve very quickly, for example new scoring models 
based on big data analysis. However, capital models need the supervisor’s prior approval.
What happens when the supervisor is deciding the approval of a model for capital purposes 
but, at the same time the entity is already using that model for loan approval/pricing?
Or even worse, what happens when the supervisor does not approve a model capital 
calculation but that model is used for management? 
Can management models and supervisory models be different?  How to align both worlds? 
These are critical questions with no easy answers that already are generating frictions 
among supervisors and financial entities. 
Recently accounting regulation about provisions have changed deeply replacing the “old” 
incurred loss model by a “new” expected credit loss (ECL model), however, at the same 
time, capital regulation13 has basically remained unchanged.
This article shows some of the interactions between prudential and accounting regulations, 
bringing to light some inconsistencies derived from changing provisions rules but at the 
same time, maintaining the original capital requirement framework.
The ideas and examples presented in this article should question the impact of IFRS9 on 
capital requirements, at least in two lines:
a) The asymmetric characteristic of the capital requirement formula combined 
with the higher cyclicality over the capital EL implies that in average, capital 
requirements probably will increase.
b) The additional cyclicality of IFRS9 will also probably increases capital 
requirements procyclicality.
This article does not expect to demonstrate previous two points with no doubt; however, 
it offers some hints that could be useful for futures empirical papers.
One interesting line of future empirical research could be to analyze if under IFRS9 the 
unexpected losses have been reduced (when comparing with incurred losses framework). 
If it is true that ECL is a better predictor than the previous provisions mechanism, 
supervisors and regulators should conclude that a review of the capital requirement 
13 Capital requirement formulas remain unchanged from the introduction of internal models.
10 Conclusions
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framework is necessary in order to include this reduction in unexpected losses in the 
capital requirement calculation.
If, on the other hand, ECL happens to be worse as a predictor for real losses than the 
previous provisions methodology, accounting regulators should probably rethink the ECL 
concept.
What, from a theoretical point of view sounds strange, it is to maintain two models that 
seems to present inconsistencies between them. The capital model, assuming that the 
best prediction for credit losses is the unconditional expected loss and, the accounting 
model, that considers it is possible to better estimate credit losses based on conditional 
expectations. 
Undoubtedly, the debate about the prociclicality of IFRS9 will continue, much focused on 
the direct effect of IFRS9 on P&L, but there is also an additional debate about how capital 
requirement rules should be affected by the new provisions paradigm.
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